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The ‘big trade–off’, described by Arthur Okun some thirty years ago, is back again. 
Equality or efficiency, or to put it differently again: modern highly developed economies 
and societies have to choose between the Scylla of income inequality or the Charybdis of 
unemployment. Furthermore, it looks like the continental European economies – 
foremost Germany and France – sided with more egalitarian ends accepting higher 
unemployment whilst the liberal economies such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom choose higher inequality for lower unemployment. In this paper it is argued, 
that the trade-off is not a supply-side necessity to maintain work effort in a situation of 
incomplete contracts, but is a politico-economic issue of particular interest groups to seek 
rents. However, unlike in Mancur Olson’s seminal approach, it is not the trade unions 
which are forming distributional coalitions on the labour market but rather the 
meritocracy which is happy to use Keynesian-type demand management in order to 
advance their material interests by pursuing a ‘Meritocratically Optimal Rate of 
Unemployment’ (MORU).   
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1.  By way of introduction: The age of inequality
* 
 
The so called Kuznets curve links economic development to income inequality and shows 
a curvilinear shape. Here, in the process of economic development, income inequality 
rises, but when reaching the highest stages of economic development, inequality begins to 
decline again.1 But since data on income distribution at individual and household levels is 
becoming available and made internationally comparable2 - particularly since growing 
income inequality in the United States, the United Kingdom and most other OECD-
countries seems to be an established trend over the past two decades - the Kuznets curve 
has come under much criticism.  
 
More importantly, the quest for equality – as a means to bolster against poverty and as the 
expression of social justice – has been strongly attacked as ‘egalitarianism’ that destroys 
market incentives3 and as being incompatible with full employment in the age of the 
service economy. Actually, the problem has been already addressed as early as the 1970ies 
by Arthur M. Okun4 under historical circumstances completely different from today’s: US 
income dispersion was decreasing then, while unemployment was higher than in most 
European countries. Furthermore, the world was divided into two different, hostile 
ideological camps: capitalism and communism. At least from an ideological point of view 
in the battle of systems during the ‘cold war’, the alleged higher efficiency of the capitalist 
market economy was not to be paid for by lower equality as this would leave the question 
of superiority open to different preferences. Only if capitalism could combine a 
sufficiently high degree of equality (social justice) with superior economic efficiency (in 
terms of growth and employment), its superiority over communism with its notorious 
failure in (intensive) growth would be proven. And the economies of the European 
countries – being extremely close to the ideological divide - seemed to be able to fulfil 
these promises during the 1960ies and 1970ies particularly well. 
 
Only after the downfall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of the systems 
confrontation, the need to combine equality and efficiency has finally disappeared. 
Interestingly, the renewed (alleged) trade-off between equality and efficiency (in terms of 
providing high levels of employment) unites the liberal-conservative political and 
academic camp with most parts of the progressive, social democratic political and 
academic camp. However, whilst the former welcomes the implicit demand for higher 
inequality5, the latter somewhat hastily demands for a (albeit hard) choice.6 It is in this 
                                                 
* This paper was written while the author was a Visiting Fellow at St. Edmund’s College of the University 
of Cambridge in June-July 2005. It is part of a larger research project ‘Employment systems in 
international comparison’ financially supported by the Hans Böckler Foundation to whom the author is 
very grateful. He is also grateful to Philip Arestis for comments and to Michael Murphy for corrections.   
1 For the original paper see Kuznets (1955). 
2 Here, the OECD and the Luxembourg Income Study-project must be mentioned. 
3 This incentive problem has been put like this: ‚The poor reduce their labour supply because they earn 
too much and the rich withdraw their labour supply because they earn too little’. John Kenneth 
Galbraith’s reaction was said to be: ‘Who believes this, will believe anything’. 
4 See Okun (1970), Okun (1975) 
5 See e.g. Machan (2002), Davis/Meyer (2000), Henry (1995), Kekes (2003),  Methfessel/Winterberg 
(1998), Hank (2000), Giersch/Paqué/Schmieding (1992), Paqué (1995) and, most notoriously, Gilder 
(1982).   3
sense, that we can speak of the age of inequality: an undisputable trend with undisputable 
negative consequences (the correlation between raising inequality and growing poverty). It 
is an ideological issue (‘social justice’) that centres prominently in political discussions and 
electoral campaigns, and an academic discourse that completely focuses on the 
microeconomic logic of market incentives. Very few dissenting economists have tried to 
keep a macroeconomic eye on the issue7 and – to my knowledge – there has not yet been 
a consistent political economy approach focusing on the obvious material interests 
involved. 
 
A first glance at the data8 casts some doubts about the ‘big trade-off’. As fig. 1 shows, 
there is certainly no detectable correlation between the absolute level of income 
dispersion and unemployment in (selected) OECD countries. However, as both variables 
at a certain point in time are dependent on too many other determinants, one would not 
expect too much of a correlation here. Yet, if the ‘trade-off argument’ holds, a strong 
correlation between the change in unemployment since the end of the ‘golden age’ of 
industrialisation in the 1970ies and the change in income dispersion must be established. 
A change in income dispersion must be established because a relative cheapening of low 
skilled labourers will increase their employment probability and therefore reduce 
unemployment (which is heavily concentrated among the low-skilled) or, at least, helps 
reducing the increase of unemployment in the age of the service economy. 
 

























Note: Income dispersion: ratio between the 9th and the 1st income decile, gross earnings; 
‘end of’ refers to comparable years (positions) in the business cycle at the end of the 
1990ies; OLS regression: R
2 = 0.018; not significant 
Source: OECD-Labour Force Survey Data and OECD Employment Outlook 1996 
 
Truly, fig.2 depicts such a correlation, which is significant but not very strong. However, 
the correlation does not say anything about the direction of causation: does causation run 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 See e.g. Iversen (1999), Scharpf (2001), Schettkat/Appelbaum (1996). 
7 Most prominently Galbraith (1998) and Harrison/Bluestone (1990). 
8 More about the origin, limitations and selection of data and a regression table presentation in part 5 
below.   4
from income dispersion to (un)employment or from unemployment to dispersion? If the 
‘trade-off argument’ was true, one would also expect, and even more so than in the 
former case, a strong correlation between the change in income dispersion and the level 
of unemployment at the end of the business cycle at the end of the 1990ies: if marked 
earnings flexibility prevents unemployment from accruing in the first place, the change in 
unemployment must not necessarily be great, but unemployment in absolute terms ought 
to be low. However, fig. 3 reveals merely a correlation too weak and insignificant to 
justify this claim! 
 
F i g u r e  2 :  C h a n g e  i n  U n e m p l o y m e n t  ( m i d  70ies – end 90ies) and Change in Income 



























Notes: Change: absolute change in D90/D10-ratio and unemployment rates; OLS 
regression: R
2 = 0.329; significant at 5% 
Source: See fig.1 
 
Figure 3: Unemployment at the End of 1990ies and Change in Income dispersion (end 


























Notes: see fig. 1 and fig. 2; OLS regression: R
2 = 0.220; significant at 10% 
Source: see fig. 1   5
 
This is where this paper comes in: I will try to tell a different story about the evolution of 
unemployment and income inequality over the past two decades, which will take a 
political economy approach, i.e. which will centre around the different distributional 
interests among societal groups in different capitalist economic settings. In part 2, I will 
extend Mancur Olson’s seminal approach to the political economy of economic 
development by focusing on the labour market and by giving it a Keynesian twist. In part 
3, I will recur to Michal Kalecki’s famous proposition that unemployment can be used as 
a strong mechanism to shift power relations in the distributional conflict of capitalism, yet 
I will transform it into a determinant of personal rather than functional income 
distribution. In part 4, I will then join the different strings together and derive an 
unemployment situation which may be called optimal as it best serves the interests of 
those capitalising most from pure market outcome – the meritocrats. Furthermore, it will 
become apparent that such a ‘Meritocratically Optimal Rate of Unemployment’ (MORU) 
may be very divers over the range of varieties of capitalistic models. In part 5, the 
predictions of the MORU theory will be empirically tested. As we are dealing with vested 
interests often transmitted into political action through ideological infiltration, the carrier 
of the message himself is sometimes accused of an ideological bias9 – that is, why any 
empirical test of political economy issues is so important.   
 
  
2.  Mancur Olson, distributional coalitions and its Keynesian twist 
 
If the connection between income inequality and unemployment is so weak and 
uncertain, why should we not just leave it there? This would be unsatisfactory for two 
reasons: Firstly, we have only tested a linear causation – but why should the relation 
between the distributional struggle and labour market performance not be of any different 
kind? The ongoing research about different varieties of capitalism10 has established the 
fact that different institutional settings may have a marked effect on economic 
performance, which alters simple linear reasoning remarkably.11 Secondly, if we would not 
pursue any type of political economy research into the – at a first glance rather weak – 
relation between unemployment and income inequality, we might never be able to 
provide the ‘missing link’ in Keynesian economics: “Keynesian economists had failed to 
develop a general explanation of governments’ unwillingness to supply the aggregate 
demand policies required to achieve full employment”, as John and Wendy Cornwall 
(2005: 6) claim. 
 
Mancur Olson provides the starting point as he has established one of the most powerful 
political economy approaches in his ‘Rise and Decline of Nations’12 that directly links 
income inequality and unemployment. He claims that societies produce ever more interest 
groups that seek to advance their particular well-being at the expense of the well-being of 
the society as a whole. Such interest groups are only able to pursue this kind of ‘rent-
                                                 
9 Obviously, ‘ideology’ as an object of scientific investigation is here confused with ‘ideology’ as a subject 
guiding (un)scientific investigation.  
10 See e.g. Esping-Andersen (1990), Hall/Soskice (2001), Amable (2003),   
11 Probably best known is the so called ‘hump-shaped’ relation between the degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining and labour market performance; see Calmfors/Drifill (1988).  
12 Olson (1982)   6
seeking’ behaviour – which comes as a public good to all individuals which comprise that 
group – if the groups are small and homogenous enough to overcome the ‘cooperation 
trap’.13 Although such interest groups may evolve in every market14, unemployment is 
best explained according to Olson if the interest groups on both sides of the labour 
market are taken into focus. These are trade unions and employer’s organisations. For 
two reasons, in a variety of microeconomic approaches (insider-outsider theories, NAIRU 
theories, efficiency bargain and right-to-manage models) the supply side has been set at 
centre stage of the investigations: Firstly, unemployment is usually associated with the 
notion of ‘too high wages’ which can better be explained if labour supply (by forming 
unions) is able to collude an effective distributive coalition.15 Secondly, once we assume 
commodity markets as competitive, there would always be pressure to raise real wages by 
reducing prices – which ought to happen if Walras’ Law of markets applies. Therefore, if 
unemployment becomes a long-term problem of advanced economies, according to 
Olson, it must stem from the willingness and ability of trade unions to effectively seek 
rent for their members – which are mostly low skilled, blue collar workers in 
manufacturing industries. Hence, the variance in national labour market performances 
obviously depends on the incubation process of interest groups in general and trade 
unions in particular and the time stretch without significant institutional, legal or other 
alterations in a particular society16. The longer this time stretch, the more distributional 
coalitions, the lower growth and higher unemployment will be. Olson’s approach can 
therefore be described as a theory of ‘societal sclerosis’. 
 
Olson’s central idea that the pursuit of vested distributional interests may impinge on the 
general welfare of society, is a challenging one. However his focus on the supply side of 
the labour market is too narrow. On the one hand, he underestimates what has been 
called ‘the radius of trust’ in the literature on social capital, i.e. the possibility and 
willingness of groups (trade unions in this case) to internalise the external effects of their 
actions in order to reduce the negative repercussions of rent-seeking behaviour.17 
Secondly, the empirical evidence – as seen above – is not very strong. Thirdly, the 
reasoning rests entirely on the microeconomics of general equilibrium theory. But if we 
bring Keynesian macroeconomics in, unemployment may no longer (at its core) be the 
result of misguided wage policy but of macroeconomic policy failures. Furthermore, here, 
income inequality (in an equilibrium position) would be no longer be technically 
determined by the marginal productivity of different jobs requiring different skills but it 
would depend on what society rates as ‘fair’ and ‘tolerable’. This is something James K. 
Galbraith (1997; 1998) calls ‘job or wage structure’.18  Here, of course, unemployment can 
                                                 
13 This has been established and elaborated in his famous ‚Logic of Collective Action’; see Olson (1965). 
14 “Such action occurs through professional associations, labour unions, farm organizations, trade 
associations, and oligopolistic collusions of firms in concentrated industries” (Olson 1996: 74). 
15 For complementarities of modern (static) microeconomic labour market approaches and Olson’s 
(evolutionary) political economy approach see e.g. Belke (1997). 
16 Olson (1996: 76) mentions ‘revolutionary upheavals’, ‘totalitarian repression’ or ‘foreign occupations’, 
but drastic institutional change (as, for instance, under the Thatcher era) may also be counted.  
17 Which lies behind the hump-shaped correlation mentioned above. Of course, Olson mentions 
‘encompassing organisations’, which seem to fit the requirements of a wide radius of trust. However, 
Olson firmly believes that these encompassing organisations are unstable and necessarily dissolves 
eventually.    
18 „It is a historically, socially, and politically specific set of values and pay relationships in the economy, 
within and between firms, within and across industries” (Galbraith 1997: 15); see also Galbraith 
(1998:50ff.).   7
be used in order to change established views about ‘fair’ and ‘tolerable’ levels of income 
dispersion, if Keynesian-type macroeconomic policy potentials are not sufficiently used to 
cure unemployment when it occurs or, even worse, are redirected to create or maintain 
unemployment. Now, in this post-Olsonian perspective, it would be the demand-side of 
the labour market, i.e. employers and their organisations, that pursues its vested 
distributional interests by wasting capacities and reducing general welfare for the society 
as a whole.          
    
   
3.  Michal Kalecki, Unemployment and Income Distribution, or: the 
Meritocratically Optimal Rate of Unemployment (MORU) 
 
As John and Wendy Cornwall (2005) claim, most Keynesians19 failed in posing the 
question of political limits20 to the practice of Keynesian-type interventionist employment 
policies. Yet, this may be at least partly due to the fact, that Keynes himself was not very 
thoughtful (if not downright naïve) about the possible impact of vested interests on 
economic policy. Joan Robinson (1976) noted:  
 
“Keynes liked to believe in the power of ideas to influence the course of history. 
He sometimes maintained that when the principles of employment policy were 
understood, economic affairs would be conducted rationally, and he even went so 
far as to predict a happy future in which our grandchildren could devote 
themselves entirely to the arts and graces of life.”  
 
And she also singled out whom she believed to be closer to the real world:  
 
“Kalecki’s vision of the future was more realistic. In a remarkable article published 
in 1943 on the ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’ he foresaw that when 
governments understood how to control the commercial trade cycle we should 
find ourselves in a political trade cycle.” 
 
Actually, Michal Kalecki (1943/1990) had not – as is often claimed – described a ‘political 
business cycle’21 but pointed out that ‘the industrial leaders’ may not be interested in full 
employment altogether. As he was not engaged in the investigation of the connections 
between the economy, economic policy and the political and electoral system, there is no 
hint to a political business cycle theory22 but rather to a ‘political equilibrium theory of 
unemployment’ and an indication of how this will be achieved. This is through mystifying 
an active (i.e. deficit-financed) budgetary policy as ‘unsound’ and ‘perilous’ (see Kalecki 
1943/1990: 350). A situation of lasting full employment would be, from the perspective 
                                                 
19 Particularly Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (1998) must be explicitly excluded from this charge.  
20 In a mini-symposium on ‘Is Keynesian demand management policy still viable?’ published in Vol. 17 
(1994-95) of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, not even one of the papers even mentions 
political limits. There may also be economic limitations due to the lack of cooperation of different policy 
actors; see Heise (2001), Heise (2005a).  
21 Politico-economic models and cycles have been introduced in the literature by William Nordhaus (1975) 
and R. Boddy and J. Crotty (1974) who recur to Michal Kalecki’s work.  
22 Although he claims to have presented ‘a regime of the political business cycle’; see Kalecki (1943/1990: 
355). However, he uses the term ‘political business cycle’ in a completely different way than it has become 
customary since Nordhaus; see e.g. Henley (1988).     8
of the ‘captains of industry’23, unwarranted on three accounts: 1) in general, they do not 
want the government to interfere with market processes; 2) they do not want the 
government to spend money in areas – such as public investment – where there is a 
potential competition with or crowding out of private investment; 3) they feel that lasting 
full employment changes the power relations towards the working classes and takes away 
an effective disciplinary device. These rather cloudy expositions have been re-framed in 
modern, orthodox labour market theory: in efficiency wage theories, unemployment 
guarantees to maintain productivity growth. In NAIRU theories, unemployment is needed 
to prevent the acceleration of inflation. Finally in heterodox, Kaleckian macroeconomics, 
full employment destroys the social structure of accumulation by squeezing profits24. In 
equilibrium, in order to appropriate profits, capitalists need unemployment or workers 
will be able to claim any surplus for themselves (in any combination of goods and 
leisure).25  
 
Without engaging in fundamental discussions about functional income distribution, this 
Kaleckian version of a political economy of unemployment cannot easily be made 
compatible with two decades of post-war economic history.  The co-existence of full 
employment and a positive profit share in most OECD countries in the 1950ies and 
1960ies would either require the assumption of a disequilibrium situation for the entire 
period or some degree of monopolistic competition in almost very commodity market. 
Or, as in Post Keynesian macroeconomics, functional income distribution (and the 
existence of profits) does not depend on unemployment but rather on a positive rate of 
interest (which closes the only degree of freedom of the distributional system; see e.g. 
Sraffa 1960) which is determined by liquidity preference considerations (see e.g. Riese 
1981). However, these qualifications do not necessarily eradicate the Kaleckian idea 
altogether, but might shift the focus of intention from functional to personal income 
distribution and from class conflict to meritocratic deliberations. As the expression 
‘meritocracy’ is far from being clearly defined, let us refer to the Fontana Dictionary of 
Modern Thought (1977: 384):  
 
“A word coined by Michael Young (The Rise of Meritocracy, 1958) for 
government by those regarded as possessing merit; merit is equated with 
intelligence-plus-effort,… Egalitarians often apply the word to any elitist system of 
education and government,…”  
 
And according to Benabou (2000: 321), there is “no single, value-free definition of 
meritocracy, but only preference orderings about equality of opportunities and equality of 
outcomes”.  Meritocracy, therefore, must be placed between the one extreme of 
aristocracy, where opportunities and outcomes are structured only by decent, and the 
                                                 
23 Kalecki uses different descriptions for those, who pursue their special interests through lasting 
unemployment: ‘captains of industry’, ‘industrial leaders’, ‘bosses’, ‘business leaders’, ‘businessmen’, ‘big 
business’. This leaves us without a clear idea of whom he really envisages: capitalists as the class of capital 
owners and representatives of profit-earners in functional income distribution or executive and high-
ranked white collar employees (and also profit-earners) as representatives of the higher income percentiles 
in personal income distribution. From the context and later work, one can infer that Kalecki is referring to 
capital owner and, therefore, functional income distribution.    
24 See e.g. Kotz/Donough/Reich 1994; Marglin/Schor 1990; Bowles/Edwards/Roosevelt 2005. 
25 Henley (1988: 439) points to the parallels to Marx’s ‘reserve army’.  See also Alexander (1948) and 
Feiwel (1974).   9
other extreme of egalitarianism, where opportunities and outcomes are entirely equally 
distributed among the members of a society. Obviously, modern societies have 
abandoned aristocratic structures and float somewhere between meritocracy and 
egalitarianism. Despite the degree varying considerably through redistributive welfare 
arrangements and institutions directly impinging on market outcomes, in every highly 
developed country some measure of egalitarian redistribution of opportunities and 
outcomes are employed.26 The concept of meritocratic deliberations used for our 
purpose, therefore puts the quest for income inequality at centre stage: in line with economic 
merits – defined by ‘pure’ market outcomes accepting an initial endowment of real, financial and human 
capital – any increase in net income dispersion is welcomed as improving economic efficiency. Obviously, 
someone who is better endowed with real, financial or human capital would profit 
materially from any meritocratic policy shift – yet, I do not purport that the better-offs – 
or as I will call them in line with the above given description: the elite27 – necessarily 
pursue meritocratic aims, as I am not claiming that the non-elite necessarily favours 
egalitarian ends. This may, for instance, vary considerably with the individual preference 
structure (materialistic, post-materialistic) or individual perception of income mobility. 
However, elite studies reveal a strong meritocratic orientation of the elite which has 
become more pronounced over the past two decades.28  
 
To summarise, the above outlined post-Kaleckian version of the political economy of 
unemployment does not focus on the class struggle over functional income shares but 
puts forward the idea that unemployment may be (mis-)used by the elite in order to 
champion meritocratic ideas of personal income distribution. For reasons having been 
advanced by Lester Thurow (1971) and which we will discuss below, the elite may not 
want to end re-distribution and a compression of the income (and particularly the wage) 
structure entirely, but seek an ‘optimal degree of income inequality’. Or to put it 
differently: the elite is tempted to address a policy pursuing a ‘Meritocratically Optimal 
Rate of Unemployment’, abbreviated as MORU.         
 
                 
4.   MORU in the varieties of capitalism 
 
Many studies have shown that unemployment is a strong and significant factor in 
determining income inequality in general and wage dispersion in particular measured by a 
gini-coefficient or by the ratio of highest to lowest income decile (P90/P10).29 Easy to 
                                                 
26 Although welfare arrangements have not historically been invented for egalitarian purposes, they do 
have this effect; see Baldwin (1990) and Esping-Andersen (1994: 717). 
27 ‚Elite’ is another ill-defined notion. Primarily, it is used for those groups of individuals that are able to 
take or influence collective rather than merely individual decisions: political, economic, organisational or 
media elites for instance. I presuppose that there is a strong correlation between being materially better-
off and being part of the elite – and that is why I use ‘elite’, ‘better-offs’ and ‘meritocrats’ interchangeably.   
28 This is definitely true for the media, economic and liberal-conservative political elites in Germany but 
also the social-democratic political elite has become markedly more meritocratic over the past two 
decades. Therefore, it is basically the trade union elite that still takes a non-meritocratic, egalitarian 
perspective; see e.g. Bürklin (1997).  
29 See e.g. Förster (2000) or Volscho (2004) for a comprehensive overview. Jäntti/Jenkins (2001) take a 
more sceptical view – yet they do not deny the relationship but point to a more complex interaction 
between unemployment, inflation and inequality. Below, I will discuss in more detail which income 
variable to be taken in order to capture the inequality visions of the meritocracy. Suffice to say here, that 
wage dispersion will serve as proxy as wage income is still by far the most important source of income for   10
understand, nominal wage increases in relation to labour productivity growth and 
(expected) inflation – i.e. the ‘distributional margin’ – will come under pressure if wages 
are to play any role in signalling relative scarcity. This is one of the best established 
empirical relations in economics that lies behind the (original) ‘Phillips curve’. Here, on 
the one hand it will, at least temporarily (as long as disequilibrium lasts), shift functional 
income distribution in favour of capital owners – who may be supposed to belong to the 
higher income deciles. On the other hand, unemployment always has a strong bias 
towards the less skilled – i.e. the wages of the less skilled, which can be supposed to 
belong to the lower income deciles, come under the most pressure. Adding both trends 
up, high income earners relative to low income earners will profit from unemployment – 
which simply means that wage dispersion and overall income inequality will rise with 
growing unemployment. However, the ‘inequality elasticity’ of unemployment depends on 
several factors: the overall strength of the social partners at the negotiating table (in terms 
of union density and coverage rate; see Volscho [2004]) and particularly, the collective 
bargaining system, the state’s involvement in collective bargaining and also labour market 
and welfare state regulations (EU Commission 2004: 109ff.). There is a clear and very 
strong relation between the degree of corporatism30 of a collective bargaining system, the 
strictness of labour market regulations and the generosity of the welfare state and a 
solidaristic wage policy stance in terms of the compression of the qualificational wage 
structure.31  
 
The different characteristics will be clustered to form two ‘models’: a ‘corporatist’ and a 
‘liberal model’ (see tab. 1). Since Esping-Andersen’s (1990) famous distinction between 
different ‘worlds of  welfare capitalism’, many attempts have been made to group 
different countries.32 While Amable (2003) proposes as much as five different ideal types 
of capitalism (market-based , social democratic, Asian, continental European and South 
European models), Michel Albert (1991) differentiates between an Anglo-Saxon and a 
Rhenish model of capitalism and Hall/Soskice (2001) identifies the liberal market 
economies (LME) and the coordinated market economies (CME). Without spending too 
much time on comparing the different categorisations, I will – for the sake of simplicity 
and measurability and sufficient for my limited scope – side with Albert and Hall/Soskice 
                                                                                                                                                         
the vast majority of the people and the link between wage income and unemployment (both being 
determined on the labour market) is the closest. Furthermore, it has been shown that recent trend in 
income inequality largely stem from the underlying trends in wage dispersion; see Förster (2000: 8).  
30 By corporatism, I not only mean the de jure centralisation of the wage bargaining system (i.e. at company 
or regional or nation-wide level) but also its de facto cooperation between regional and sectoral levels, union 
density and coverage rates and state involvement. Germany, for example, is often taken at face value – i.e. 
wage bargaining struck at regional-sectoral levels -, yet the high efforts of cooperation of the trade unions 
under the roof of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund is not praised accordingly. Moreover France, for 
instance, shows low union density and de jure decentralised wage bargaining, but a very high coverage rate, 
a decent degree of cooperation of unions and a high state involvement in labour market regulations which 
would not be correctly mirrored if France would be rated at low corporatism level.  
31 See e.g. Barth/Zweimüller (1995), Zweimüller/Barth (1994), Moene/Wallerstein (1996) and, 
particularily OECD (1997) where the combinations here termed ‘corporatism’ are tested. There are but 
two exceptions from this very close link: Austria and the Netherlands which both manage to provide a 
rather wide qualificational wage dispersion under a very centralised wage bargaining system – both 
countries will get a special status in this study.  
32 Gelissen (2002) provides an overview. The different specifications obviously depend on the indicators 
or dimension (i.e. welfare systems, labour market systems, collective bargaining systems, industrial 
relations systems, etc.) by which they are clustered.    11
in broadly distinguishing, at this point, a ‘corporatist bargaining model’ which is very 
much in line with Albert’s ‘Rhenish capitalism’ and Hall/Soskice’s CME and a ‘liberal 
bargaining model’ in line with Albert’s ‘Anglo-Saxon Model’  and Hall/Soskice’s LME. 
 
Table 1: Varieties of bargaining models 





-  union density 
-  coverage rate 
-  degree of centralisation 
-  degree of cooperation 
-  state involvement 
 
 
-  High density or high 
coverage 
-  High degree of 
centralisation or high 
degree of cooperation or 




-  Low density or low 
coverage rate 
-  Low degree of 
centralisation and low 
degree of cooperation or 
state involvement 
Labour market regulations  Strict labour market 
regulations (employment 
protection, minimum wages, 
etc.) 
Few labour market regulation
Welfare system  High level of social 
protection (Bismarckian 
welfare system or generous 
Beveridge welfare system)  
Low level of social 
protection (means tested 
Beveridge welfare system) 
 
 
As tab. 2 clearly shows, the selected OECD countries fit the characteristics of the two 
distinct collective bargaining models extremely well – if at all, France’s very low union 
density rate and decentralisation at the prevailing company level and Australia’s stunningly 
high coverage rate stand out as not quite fitting. Yet, in the case of France, the degree of 
cooperation and state involvement as well as labour market regulations and welfare state 
characteristics prove the point that France definitely rather sides with the corporatist than 
with the liberal model, while in the case of Australia, precisely these characteristics point 
out that it must be grouped within the liberal bargaining model.   
 
In the upper-right quadrant of fig. 4, the above described positive relation between 
unemployment and income inequality has been depicted and two different income-
dispersion curves (IP) marking the institutional differences as exposed above as 
‘corporatist’ and ‘liberal’ collective bargaining systems. Only for the sake of simplicity, a 
linear relationship has been assumed: A rise in unemployment by a certain measure will, 
therefore, cause higher income inequality in the liberal bargaining model (steeper ID 
curve) than in the corporatist model because the former’s institutions are ill-prepared to 
safeguard the lower income deciles against their weakened market position or, to put it 
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Table 2: Mapping of characteristics of the different models  





















A  30  92  Industry  High  Low  High High 
B  69  96 National  High  High  High  High 
DK 88  69  national/ 
industry 
High  High Medium  High 
F  9  95  Company  High High*  High  High 
Ger  30  79  Industry  High  Low  High High 
I   35  82,5  Industry  High High  High  Medium
NL  27  82  Industry  High  Low  High  Medium
N  54,3  82,5  Industry  High High  High  High 
SWE 79  92  Industry  High  Low  High High 
 
Liberal Model 
AUS  24,5  82,5  industry Low  High  Low Low 
CAN  28,1  32,0 Company  Low  Low  Low  Low 
NZL  22,7  27,5 Company  Low  Low  Low  Low 
UK  29  39 Company  Low  Low  Low  Medium
USA  12,8  14,0 Company  Low  Low  Low  Low 
Notes: bold = fitting characteristic of respective model; italic = unfitting characteristic of 
respective model; a = OECD coordination and centralisation score < 2 means ‘low’, < 2 
means ‘high’ level of cooperation; b = governmental involvement index according to 
Golden/Lange/Wallerstein < 8 means ‘low’, > 8 means ‘high’ governmental involvement 
in collective bargaining; c = OECD employment protection index score < 1,5 means 
‘low’, >1,5 but below 2,0 means ‘medium’, > 2,0 means ‘high’ labour market regulation; d 
= social expenditure as percentage of GDP < 20% means ‘low’; > 20% but < 25% means 
‘medium’ and > 25% means ‘high’ level of social protection; * = although France is 
ranked as ‘low’ according to the Golden/Lange/Wallerstein index, this has convincingly 
been disputed by others: Ruysseveldt/Visser (1996); Lehmbruch (1984) 
Source: EU Commission (2004: 79); Amable (2003); OECD-Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX), 1980-2001; Wallerstein/Golden (2000); OECD Employment Outlook 1994; 
OECD Employment Outlook 1997; OECD Employment Outlook 1999; 















































































‚liberal’  ‚liberal’ 
‚continental’ 
‚scandinavian-egalitarian’   14
In the upper left quadrant of fig. 4, a link between the level of income inequality and the 
interests of the meritocracy is established. For reasons exposed above, the highest income 
decile33 is here taken as proxi for those comprising the elite which I have chosen to call 
‘meritocracy’ – and the utility derived from their (absolute as well as relative34) income 
measures the interests of the meritocracy, and there are several reasons why the utility 
(and even underlying income) may eventually reach a maximum with growing income 
inequality, i.e. with growing relative income: a) increasing inequality is accompanied by 
growing political instability which may harm economic growth and (gross) income 
generation in general, but may also impinge on crime prevention and property protection 
cost in particular and may, thus, be detrimental to the (net) income of the meritocracy 
(see e.g. Persson/Tabellini 1991 and Thurow 1971); b) increasing income inequality, 
simply by reducing the overall marginal propensity to consume, may reduce aggregate 
demand expectations and, therefore, reduce private investment outlays and, subsequently, 
private consumption spending (see e.g. Heise 1999)35; c) research into social capital has 
established a clear (negative) link between income inequality and social capital in a society 
and also created a clear (positive) link between the stock of social capital and economic 
growth (see e.g. Halpern 2005) or d) it may, as Lester Thurow (1971: 327) puts it, depend 
on the “aesthetic taste for equality or inequality similar in nature to a taste for paintings”. 
However, as can also be seen from fig.4, the ‘optimal degree of inequality’ (i.e. where the 
utility function of the meritocracy reaches its maximum) will vary according to the 
established cultural embedding of individual tastes and values. As is well known from 
several studies (see e.g. Alesina/Di Tella/MacCullock 2001; Delhey 1999), we may not 
only distinguish between the liberal and the corporatist economies, but distinguish also 
amongst the corporatist economies between Scandinavian-egalitarian and continental 
economies.36   
 
IHD curves in fig. 4 portray this relationship: the more egalitarian values and attitudes a 
society professes, the higher will be the cost (in terms of growth detriment and crime 
prevention) of growing income inequality and, therefore, the lower the ‘optimal degree of 
inequality’. Important to notice is that this inference has been made from the perspective 
of a meritocracy embedded in a specific cultural setting.37  Finally, it is only a small step to 
explain the ‘Meritocratically Optimal Rates of Unemployment’ (MORU). If there is 
                                                 
33 It would be very reasonable to choose the highest income quartile (P75) as proxi for the meritocracy in 
order to wider the scope of investigation. However, if at all (see below) comparable data are only available 
for the lowest, the middle and the highest income deciles. Despite these qualifications, a very limited 
sketch of P75/P25-ratio is exposed in appendix 1 in order to show the robustness of the argument.   
34 „Individuals are not just interested in their own incomes. The incomes of other individuals may appear 
in their own utility functions” (Thurow 1971: 327). 
35 Das (1993) has established an impact of income inequality on (the business cycle patterns) of GDP-
growth rates on the grounds of a standard neoclassical model. 
36 The main difference between the two value systems is the stronger belief in meritocratic attitudes and 
status ascription in the continental model; see Delhey (1999: 7). 
37 If the value side of different models is coupled with the labour market and collective bargaining side, 
the IHD curves not only become distinguishable in their degrees of compression but also in the maximum 
income positions being related to the productivity potential of different models. Many studies (see e.g. 
Soskice 1999) have revealed that more corporatist economies may hold a productivity advantage over 
more liberal economies, i.e. providing a ‘bigger cake’ to be distributed. However, this is a facet of 
institutional comparisons that is of no concern for the arguments produced here (but may, for instance, 
explain why German employers cannot bring themselves to abandon the (superior in terms of 
productivity performance) German model; see Thelen (2000).    15
anything like an optimal position in personal income distribution and unemployment is a 
strong explanatory variable in income inequality, there must certainly be a magnitude of 
unemployment which can be associated with the establishment and maintenance of those 
model-specific distributions. In the bottom right quadrant of fig. 4, such MORUs are 
determined: it is the highest, if a corporatist bargaining model is coupled with a 
continental value system showing an intermediary egalitarian stance (MORUconcor). The 
MORU is lowest, if a corporatist bargaining system that allows for high(er) wage 
dispersion meets a continental value system (MORUcondec).38 And there are two 
intermediary MORUs if a liberal bargaining system is mixed with a liberal, non-egalitarian 
value system (MORUliberal) or if a corporatist bargaining systems meets a Scandinavian-
egalitarian value system (MORUscancor). 
 
Table 3: Varietes of MORUs 









MORUconcor  Corporatist 
(centralised) 






MORUscancor  Corporatist Scandinavian-
egalitarian 
Low inequality 
elasticity + low 
inequality tolerance 
MORUliberal  Liberal Liberal High  inequality 




MORUcondec  Corporatist 
(decentralised) 





In tab. 3  an overview of the different collective bargaining model and value system 
mixtures is given and the institutionally embedded incentive structure sketched.    
 
 
5.  The empirics of MORU 
 
Before we will now take a closer look at the empirical backing of the exposed political 
economy of meritocracy, let us first formulate some hypothesis that can be derived from 
                                                 
38 I am not describing all possible MORUs but only those, which will be tested empirically. If there were 
economies that would couple a liberal bargaining system with an egalitarian value system, we would expect 
them to have the lowest MORU.   16
what has been unfolded above. In a meritocratically optimal equilibrium, we would expect 
the continental economies to have the lowest unemployment rate to be those which 
organise a high level of wage dispersion within a corporatist bargaining setting, i.e. show 
rather high income inequality. In liberal economies, we would expect a simultaneity of 
high income inequality and an intermediate position with respect to unemployment. 
Although the Scandinavian corporatist economies also would be expected to hold an 
intermediate position with respect to unemployment, income inequality must be much 
lower here. Moreover the corporatist-continental economies would be expected to show 
an intermediate position with respect to income inequality, yet the highest unemployment 
rate of all country clusters (see tab. 4). 
 
Table 4: Hypothetical equilibrium levels of unemployment and income inequality in 
varieties of capitalism 
    
MORU 
 






























For at least three reasons, we should also take a look at trends (i.e. changes in time) rather 
than exclusively levels: 1) no economy will ever be in a position of stable equilibrium and, 
2) we cannot expect the meritocracy to be able to completely achieve its goals in terms of 
pushing the economy towards a position which would best serve their interests; 3) 
comparable data on unemployment rates as well as income inequality still show a high 
degree of imponderability with respect to levels (see e.g. Moran 2005), but should be 
more reliable with respect to developments. Therefore, we would have to work out what 
development we would expect of the different country clusters to take if they were all to 
start off from the same position, which would be a position of (near) full employment 
coupled with a rather egalitarian wage and incomes structure – i.e. a description which fits 
very well the situation at the end of the ‘golden age’ in the 1970ies: In tab. 5 the ‘golden 
age’ shows in a low average unemployment rate of only 2.2% in the early 1970ies in 
almost every of the selected OECD countries (low variance!) and the lowest income 
inequality in the post-war period in every of the selected OECD countries (low variance, 
yet different values and attitudes are certainly discernible).  
 
At the end of the 1990ies, after three major economic crisis, the picture has changed: 
unemployment has not only more than doubled to an average of 5.6%, the variance has 
also more than doubled – i.e. some countries must have coped much better than others. 
The same is true for income inequality (and underlying wage dispersion): Over the past 
two decades it has not only considerably increased but the texture of inequality has also   17
become pronouncedly different (much higher variance!). Again, some countries have 
suffered (or allowed for) much more dispersion than others – and it will be our task to see 
whether there are distinguishable patterns. We would expect the Scandinavian, corporatist 
economies to show only a moderate increase in unemployment and income inequality as 
they produce a medium MORU and are very reluctant to inequality. On the premises of 
the exposed theory, the liberal countries will be expected to show a moderate increase in 
unemployment and rather high change in income dispersion, while the continental 
countries would have to pay its only small increase in income inequality with a marked 
increase in unemployment – something which those continental countries would have 
been able to prevent (small increase in unemployment) which allowed for an at least 
moderate increase in inequality (see tab. 6).        
 
Table 5: Unemployment and income inequality in the early 1970ies and late 1990ies 














NL  2.9 2.5 -0.4 2.56 2.91 +0.35 
DK  2.8 4.4 +1.6 2.15  2.15  +0.0 
Ger  1.8 7.8 +6.0 2.88  3.04  +0.16 
SWE  2.0 4.9 +2.9 2.03  2.22  +0.19 
NOR  1.5 3.3 +1.8 2.05  2.08  +0.03 
F  2.8 8.5 +5.7 3.25  3.05  -0.20 
B  2.3 6.7 +4.4 2.30  2.20  -0.10 
I  5.0 10.4  +5.4 2.32  2.40  +0.08 
A  1.3 3.6 +2.3 3.45  3.66  +0.21 
USA  5.6 4.0 -1.6 3.78 4.57 +0.79 
CAN  5.0 6.8 +1.8 4.02  4.17  +0.15 
UK  2.0 5.0 +3.0 2.91  3.45  +0.54 
NZL  0.5 3.9 +3.4 2.89  3.41  +0.52 
AUS  2.7 6.3 +3.6 2.73  2.87  +0.14 
(unweighted) 
Average 
2.7 5.6 +2.8 2.81  3.01  +0.20 
Variance 2.2  5.08  +4.79 0.399  0.603  +0.204 
Note: ‘mid-70‘ refers to the respective year with lowest unemployment in the first half of 
the 1970ies; ‘end-70‘ refers to the last year before inequality started to rise – never later 
than 1979; ‘end-90’ refers to the end of the business cycle in the late 1990ies/early first 
decade of 21st century (unemployment rates) and respective year for income dispersion (if 
available; otherwise the latest available year is taken)   
Source: UNR = internationally standardised unemployment rates: OECD (2005); Income 
dispersion = 9th decile/ 1st decile; daily, weekly or monthly gross earnings: OECD-Labour 
Market Statistics DATA and OECD (1996a) for Austria and Norway. For Norway, data is 
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Table 6: Hypothetical trends in unemployment and inequality in varieties of capitalism 
    
∆UNR 
 






























Before we will go into the empirics, let us discuss which variable we would ideally like to 
look at and, under the constraints of only limited comparable data availability, which 
proxy to take. First of all, it must be remembered that we are going to take the perspective 
of the meritocracy. ‘Meritocracy’ has been proxied by the ‘highest income percentiles’ 
which is usually taken as the highest income decile (which is, for methodological reasons, 
the 9th decile). But what income category ought to be taken: gross or net income, 
individual or household income, wage or overall (including capital) income? As a 
meritocratic perspective is taken – i.e. earnings according to merits depending on the 
endowment with human, financial and real capital and its putting to use on different 
markets –, individual, overall, net income seems to be most appropriate. However, 
although differences in absolute levels of income dispersion between different concepts 
may be quite substantial and some reordering of country rankings may be possible (which 
is probably most pronounced in the case of Austria; see e.g. Pontussen 2000: 297ff. and 
Guger/Marterbauer 2004), the differences in gross and net income varying across the 
different countries and country clusters and non-wage income seems to be more 
important for the meritocracy than for any other income-group in society, the results are 
not very sensitive with respect to the income concept chosen (particularly if trends rather 
than levels are measured) for the following reasons: 1) trends in disposable income 
distribution and individuals gross earnings are very similar (see e.g. Smeeding (2002: 195) 
and compare with inequality trends as displayed in tab. 5); 2) redistributing welfare 
systems narrow  inequality levels but follow the exact trend of market inequality, i.e. more 
egalitarian economies (with respect to market (gross) income) show higher levels of 
redistribution (with respect to outcome in net incomes) than less egalitarian economies39 
and the trends in rising market income inequality are mirrored by the trends in lowered 
redistribution (see e.g. Kenworthy/Pontussen 2005; Burniaux 1998); 3) the most 
important factor in determining levels and trends of income inequality is by far the 
underlying levels and trends of wage dispersion – and this result is robust to changes in 
the method of decomposing earnings into different income categories (see e.g. Burniaux 
1998; Förster 2000). 
 
 
                                                 
39 Which has been called a ‚paradox of redistribution’ by Iversen/Soskice (2004).   19
Table 7: Unemployment and income inequality at the end of the 1990ies in varieties of 
capitalism; absolute levels 
   MORU 
   Low  Medium  High 
 
Low 












ID:     3.28 
[0.281] 
  (Ger; F; B; I) 
UNR: 8.4 
[2.4] 
















ID:     3.69 
[0.453] 
 
Notes: italic numbers in square brackets show the variance among country clusters. The 
overall variance in unemployment rates is 5.08 and in income dispersion 0.603. 
Source: See tab. 5 
 
There are basically two sources that would be able to provide internationally comparable 
data on levels and trends of income inequality: the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and 
the OECD Labour Market Statistics. As the LIS provides disposable income data based 
on household income rather than individual income, this study relies on the OECD 
Labour Market Statistics. Although the national definitions and sources are not entirely 
similar (see appendix 2) and the data does not cover the same time period for all 
countries, this seems to be as close as we can get to standardised and comparative data 
and, for the reasons outlined above, it will surely suffice with respect to income trends but 
may also be taken as moderately reliable with respect to a comparison of levels. 
 
In tab. 7 fourteen OECD countries have been clustered and their respective (unweighted) 
average unemployment rates and income inequality scores (D9/D1-ratio) displayed. 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway form the Scandinavian, corporatist model, Germany, 
France, Italy and Belgium comprise the continental, centralised model, Canada, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand make up the liberal 
model and the Netherlands and Austria are taken separately to form the continental, 
decentralised model. The country clusters not only happen to follow exactly the 
hypothetical patterns put forward above (compare tab. 7 to tab. 4!) but show also only 
small variances – which is to say that differences among the countries forming a cluster 
are low (which one would expect, if the cluster make sense).         
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Table 8: Changes in unemployment and income inequality in varieties of capitalism 
(absolute change since 70ies) 
    
∆UNR 
 
   Low  Medium  High 
 
Low 




ID:    +0.04 
[0.018] 
(Ger; F; B; I) 
UNR: +5.4 
[0.482] 







ID:     +0.28 
[0.008] 















ID:     +0.42 
[0.086] 
 
Notes: italic numbers in square brackets show the variance among country clusters. The 
overall variance in changes in unemployment rates is 4.79 and in changes in income 
dispersion 0.204. 
Source: See tab. 5 
 
The picture does not change at all, if we take a look at the trends in unemployment and 
income inequality: Again, as was the hypothesis, we see a very distinct pattern of changes 
across the varieties of capitalism with, partly, extremely high degrees of coherence 
amongst the country clusters40 - i.e. the overall variance is an inter-model variance, not an 
intra-model variance. The results are clear: Scandinavian, corporatist economies have 
done better in terms of unemployment increases as they are, on the one hand, less 
tolerant to inequality and, on the other hand, allowed for a slightly stronger increase in 
inequality than the continental, centralised countries. The liberal economies experienced a 
strong rise in inequality which was triggered by a modest increase in unemployment while 
the continental, decentralised economies paid for the good labour market performance by 
an intermediary rise in income dispersion despite its low tolerance for inequality (as 
compared to the liberal model). 
                                                 
40 The rather poor performance of the continental, decentralised cluster with respect to variance in 
unemployment trends is not really a surprise as we only have a sample of two countries. Furthermore, in 
the case of the liberal economies, the rather high variance stems only from the exceptionally well 
development of unemployment in the US as compared to the early 1970ies which is due to a number of 
very distinct factors. Only one is that unemployment rates in the USA are seriously underestimated as a 
large part of long-term unemployment show in prison inmate figures rather than unemployment figures; 
see e.g. Katz/Krueger (1999) or Western/Beckett (1999). If the data was corrected for these 
underestimations, the variance would drop to below 1.0!    21
 
To make the empirical picture complete, let us come back to the correlations shown in 
fig. 1 – 3. We started off with realising that there is no correlation between the level of 
unemployment and the level of income inequality but a rather weak, yet significant 
correlation between the change in income inequality and the change in unemployment 
(see tab.9, regressions 3 and 5). Although the ‘big trade-off’-causality has been questioned 
above on the grounds that there is only a weak correlation between the change in 
inequality and levels of unemployment (see regression 6 where reported DW figures also 
suggest a misspecification), if the inverse causation running from unemployment (changes 
and levels) to inequality (changes and levels) suggested by the exposed MORU theory was 
correct, the rather weak and insignificant correlations would depend on the model-
specific variations resulting in non-linear relations between dependent and independent 
variables. Once this is taken into account by introducing a simple variable catching the 
affiliation of individual countries to specific country clusters, we would expect a clear rise 
in the strength and significance of the relationships. As we can see from regressions 1 and 
4 in tab. 9, this is actually the case – rendering not only the independent variables ‘change 
in unemployment rates’ significant (in equation 1 and more significant in equation 4) but 
also the variable ‘Model’ and the whole specification (see F test) and it reduces clearly the 
risk of misspecified functions (as in equations 5 and 6).      
 
















UNREnd90  -  -  - .041  -  -  -.055*  
∆UNR  - .173*  - .138  -  - .079***  - .069**  - 
Model  .376** -  - .106* -  - 
R-Square .425  .151  .018  .517  .329  .220 
F test  4.063**  2.142  .219  5.876**  5.877**  3.427* 
DW test  2.282  1.515  1.390  1.869  1.033  .937 
N 14  14  14  14  14  14 
Notes: IDEnd90 = P90/P10-ratio at the end of the 1990ies; ∆ID = absolute change in 
income distribution between the end of the 1970ies and the end of the 1990ies; 
UNREnd90 = internationally standardized unemployment rate at the end of the 1990ies; 
∆UNR = absolute change in unemployment rates between early 1970ies and late 1990ies; 
Model = variable catching different model affiliation; *** = significant at 1% error level; 
** = significant at the 5% error level, * = significant at the 10% error level; DW test = 
Durbin-Watson test on autocorrelation; N = number of cases 
Source: See tab. 5 
 
Although we do not want to go into country details in this study, it might still be 
worthwhile having a few words about the model standing out in this comparison, namely, 
the continental, decentralised model represented by Austria and the Netherlands. How 
did those two countries, although they seem to show very much the same features with 
respect to labour market regulations, welfare systems and the collective bargaining system 
as the rest of the continental countries under investigation here, manage to provide a 
higher level of income inequality and a stronger increase in inequality than the rest of 
Europe – which seem to be rewarded with a better employment record? In the case of 
Austria, most of the dispersion can be attributed to a high inter-industry differentiation   22
with a strong impact of gender-biased, tourism oriented service sectors (see 
Guger/Marterbauer 2004; Pontussen 2000: 295). In order to keep the Austrian touristic 
industry competitive (particularly with respect to German tourists and a fixed parity of the 
Austrian Schilling to the Deutschmark), Austrian trade unions partly cured the ‘cost 
disease of services’ by accepting a high and growing wage dispersion.41 In the case of the 
Netherlands, it is more difficult to explain. Undoubtedly, the situation changed only after 
the famous tri-partite ‘Wassenaar agreement’ attempted to solve the ‘Dutch disease’. A 
quite substantial cut in collective social welfare spending (replaced by private provisions; 
the so called ‘Cappuccino model’) and special agreements on industry-wage bargains 
seemed to have paved the way for higher inequality. Yet, in both cases, the reward in 
terms of a superior employment performance did not come about through supply-side 
channels but almost exclusively through macroeconomic policy channels (i.e. fiscal policy; 
see e.g. Heise/Tüselmann 2004; Schettkat 2003) and unit labour cost advantages of small 
countries facing a fixed exchange rate with their most important trading partner 
(Germany in both cases). 42 Furthermore, the very recent unemployment trends in both 
countries seem to put their achievements at risk as – certainly according to this theory – 
macroeconomic policy management to establish the respective MORU must be matched 
with the ability to conduct such a policy. This problem will be taken up again further 
down.       
 
 
6.  Conclusion: MORU and the policy of full employment in the EU 
 
The empirics are so strong that the proposed political economy of meritocracy cannot 
easily be ignored. However, this is not the place for a conspiracy theory of 
unemployment. It would certainly be oversimplifying to argue that the political actor – i.e. 
governments and central banks – care only for meritocratic interests. Even if the very 
individuals who are acting on behalf of the political actor were taken as part of the 
meritocracy, in a democratic electoral environment it would be difficult for them to 
pursue their interests outspokenly if they cared for being re-elected. Again, Michal Kalecki 
foresaw already as early as the mid-1940ies, how meritocratic politics will nevertheless 
prevail, even if the meritocracy represents only a tiny minority of society and their 
interests stand against the interests of the general public welfare: By way of  de-
legitimizing or de-capabilising Keynesian macropolicies43 in academic and public 
discourses and enthroning orthodox policies of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’44, the 
economic policy maker gets the instruments of coarse-tuning meritocratic unemployment 
                                                 
41 Marin (1983) mentions a ’principle of centralism by decentralization’ suggesting a lack of top-level 
coordination of relative wages.    
42 Partly, an intentional ‚beggar-thy-neighbour-policy had been pursued, partly the exceptional wage 
increases in the aftermath of the German unification boom in the early 1990ies played a role; see e.g. 
OCED (1996b). 
43 In a first round, the ‚monetarist counter-revolution’ made Keynesian policies accountable for the 
stagflation problems and growing public indebtness of the 1980ies and 1990ies, in a second round, 
globalisation has been claimed to undermine the capabilities of Keynesian policy making at national levels. 
Both blows taken together were severe enough to even turn progressive, non-economic social scientists 
and social democratic policy maker away from Keynesian demand management; see e.g. Scharpf (1991); 
Iversen (1999).   
44 The actual transmission from interests to ideology to public policy in modern media democracies, I have 
presented against the background of German Social Democratic Politics; see Heise (2005b).   23
at hand whether he is aware of it or not. By way of ‘under-cover, hidden’ Keynesian 
macropolicies he, nevertheless, has instruments to fine-tune unemployment if the 
respective MORU is close at reach45 – and academics fail to address the obvious 
discrepancies between outspokenly neo-liberal, supply-side advocates (‘read my lips’) and 
the very same having pursued a macropolicy which most closely resembles Keynesianism: 
the Reagan and George W. Busch administrations in the USA and the Thatcher 
administration in the UK! What seems to be a puzzle and can, therefore, only be 
addressed as ‘ironic’, as has been done by Norbert Andel in his presidential speech to the 
International Institute of Public Economics46, is perfectly understandable in the context 
of a political economy of meritocracy. 
 
What are the consequences of the political economy of meritocracy exposed above? 
Firstly, it is important to address the interests and hidden agenda involved. Quite as it was 
Mancur Olson’s approach, in order to let the public welfare prevail, distributional 
interests must be rejected and ‘distributional coalitions’ abolished. This, however, is not as 
easy as it sounds because the meritocracy does not ‘seek its rents’ through organisations 
that act as monopolies on markets but rather through elite pressure that monopolises 
public opinion (‘pensée unique’). In such a state, only educating the public can work and a 
less uniform ideology of mass political parties (i.e. veritable ‘political competition’) would 
help. Secondly, one may be tempted to think of reducing the inequality tolerance of 
society by, for instance, a collusion of those suffering most from the policy of 
meritocracy: the low skilled unemployed. However, this may turn out to be a politically 
very costly and probably uncontrollable path if it helps radical parties to settle and grow in 
the political spectrum. Thirdly, one might think of joining the continental, decentralised 
model by increasing the inequality elasticity of unemployment. However, there are also 
drawbacks to this solution: On the one hand, there seems to be a trade off between 
inequality and efficiency in terms of productivity growth. An egalitarian wage policy has, 
for instance, always served as ‘productivity whip’ in Sweden and a productivity slowdown 
is alleged to have accompanied the good employment performance of the Netherlands 
(see Naastepad/Kleinknecht 2004; Kleinknecht 2003). On the other hand, dispersing the 
wage scale particularly at the low skilled end may reduce employer’s incentives to train the 
workforce and can severely harm production systems that are based on vocational 
education (e.g. Germany; see Rogers Hollingsworth 2000: 284ff.). But most importantly, 
this solution is based on the capability of the political actor to use – although this will not 
necessarily be the announced policy – monetary and fiscal policy measures in order to fine 
                                                 
45 Which is a very important part of the story as the political situation may easily become unstable if 
growing inequality (and poverty) would be paralleled with rising unemployment – remember the infamous 
‘Toxteth riots’ at the beginning of the Thatcher era when unemployment soared and inequality began to 
rise dramatically! The meritocracy has no interests in surpassing ‘its MORU’. Again, the actual making of 
the policies must not necessarily be downright meritocratic, but may, for instance, come about by a 
‘pragmatic’ monetary policy taking unemployment (or the ‘output gap’) in a symmetric way into 
consideration (i.e. the policy reaction function includes output gaps just as much as inflation gaps). This 
may explain why the monetary policy of the FED is typically regarded as more ‘pragmatic’ than the 
monetary policy of the ECD or its forerunner, the Deutsche Bundesbank (see e.g. Fritsche et al. 2005 or 
Skilos 2004). On the other hand, the anti-inflation bias associated with ‘sound monetary policy’ plays a 
crucial in role in keeping up pressure on inequality (directly and via unemployment; see e.g. Lippi 1999:  
63ff.).  
46 „It is ironic that in the same country where the counterrevolution against the keynesian revolution 
originated, the conservative government uses dept finance to an extent without any parallel in the time of 
peace“ (Andel 1986: 11).   24
tune the economy. If, albeit, governments have ‘tied their hands’ to principles of ‘sound 
money’ and ‘sound finance’ not only ideologically but also institutionally – as is the case in 
the European Union with the independence of the European Central Bank and the 
establishment of the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ -, they may find it difficult to pursue the 
kind of expansionary macropolicy needed to reward growing wage dispersion and income 
inequality.    
 
We have to face reality: in economic particulars, everything is directed towards the 
distribution of outcomes. This is the case in direct economic encounters on markets, this 
is also the case in societal encounters most directly through social policies and, of course, 
through economic policies in general. To believe, as Keynes seemed to have done, that 
there are ‘objective’ economic policies based on the ‘correct’ understanding of the ‘real 
economic world’ and which are ‘functionally’ addressed to cure economic problems (as 
the dentist cures tooth aches47) does not take into account that economic policy is 
embedded within a political system that has to accommodate divers interests. Mancur 
Olson (1996: 92) concluded a summing up of his theory in the following:  
 
“The most important implication of the analysis, however, is that the only real 
solution is for societies to acquire a better understanding of economics and of the 
present argument. … No historical process that is understood is inevitable.”  
 
Despite my disagreement with Olson’s particular approach and my alternative way of 
looking at politico-economic matters, this general statement can certainly and 
wholeheartedly be embraced.           
 
                                                 
47 „But, chiefly, do not let us overestimate the importance of the economic problem, or sacrifice to its 
supposed necessities other matters of greater and more permanent significance. It should be a matter for 
specialists – like dentistry. If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, 
competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid” (Keynes 1930/1972: 332).    25
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Appendix 2: Earnings Documentation 
Australia 
Definition: Gross weekly earnings in main job (all jobs prior to 1988) of full-time 
employees. 
Source: Household survey (annual supplement, usually in August, to monthly labour 
force survey). 
Publication/data provider: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Weekly Earnings of Employees 
(Distribution). 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: The data refer to the most recent pay period prior to the interview.  Earnings 
deciles are Secretariat interpolations of the published data on the distribution of 
employees by earnings class. 
Austria 
Definition: Gross daily earnings, standardised to a monthly basis, taking into account the 
recorded number of days of insurance contributions (excluding civil servants). 
Source: Social security data. 
Publication/data provider: Austrian Central Statistical Office. 
Workers not covered: Most civil servants and all apprentices. 
Note: The figures include special payments such as holiday and Christmas remuneration.  
Earnings above the ceiling for social insurance contributions are recorded at the level of 
that ceiling, precluding the calculation of D9 for certain years. 
Belgium 
Definition: Gross weekly earnings of full-time workers (including civil servants). 
Source: Social security data. 
Publication/data provider: Belgium Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité 
(INAMI). 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: Earnings deciles are Secretariat interpolations of the provided data on earnings 
distribution. Earnings above the ceiling for social insurance contributions are recorded at 
the level of that ceiling, precluding the calculation of D9 for certain years. 
Canada 
Definition: Gross annual earnings of full-time, full-year workers. 
Source: Household survey (Survey of Consumer Finances). 
Publication/data provider: Analytical Studies Branch, Statistics Canada. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note:  Special adjustments have been made to improve coverage and comparability 
between the years shown.   33
Denmark 
Definition: Gross hourly earnings. 
Source: Tax registers (annual earnings data) and social security data (hours worked). 
Publication/data provider:  The data were supplied by Professor Niels Westergård-
Nielsen, Centre for Labour Economics, Aarhus Business School. 
Workers not covered: Workers with wage rates lower than 80 per cent of the minimum 
wage. 
Note: The data are derived from annual wage-income (including all types of taxable wage-
income) recorded in tax registers, divided by actual hours worked, as recorded in a 
supplementary pension scheme register. 
France 
Definition: Net annual earnings of full-time, full-year workers. 
Source: Salary records of enterprises. (Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales). 
Publication/data provider: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques 
(INSEE), Séries longues sur les salaires. 
Workers not covered: Agricultural and general government workers. 
Note: The data are adjusted for annual hours worked to represent full-year equivalent 
earnings. The data for 1981, 1983, and 1990 are estimations by INSEE. Earnings are net 
of employee social security contributions but not of income tax. 
Germany (western Germany) 
Definition: Gross monthly earnings of full-time workers. 
Source: Household survey (German Socio-Economic Panel). 
Publication/data provider: Secretariat calculations. 
Workers not covered: Apprentices. 
Note: Data include 1/12 of supplementary payments comprising 13th month pay, 14th 
month pay, holiday allowances and Christmas allowances. 
Italy  
Definition: Gross monthly earnings of full-time employees. 
Source: Social security data collected by the Instituto Nazionale de Previdenza Sociale 
(INPS). 
Publication/data provider:  Data provided by Claudia Villosio, Ricerche e Progetti, 
Torino, based on the INPS Panel Dataset. 
Workers not covered: Agricultural and general government workers. 
Netherlands 
Definition: Annual earnings of full-time, full-year equivalent workers. 
Source: Enterprise survey (Survey of Earnings).   34
Publication/data provider: Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek, Dutch Central 
Bureau of Statistics. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note:  Earnings deciles are Secretariat interpolations of the published data on the 
distribution of employees by earnings class.  Occasional payments (overtime, holiday, etc.) 
are included. 
Norway 
Definition: Hourly wages. 
Source: Household survey (Norwegian Level of Living Surveys), 1980, 1983, 1987 and 1990. 
Publication/data provider: The data and decile calculations were provided by Erling 
Barth and Halvor Mehlum, Institute for Social Research, Oslo. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: For workers not paid by the hour, their weekly or monthly wages are divided by 
the corresponding number of hours worked.  Observations of less than 25 and more than 
1 000 kroner per hour (in 1991 prices) are excluded.  Age limits are 19 to 55 years. 
New Zealand 
Definition: Usual gross weekly earnings of full-time employees. 
Source: Household survey (Household Economic Survey). 
Publication/data provider: Estimates provided by the New Zealand Department of 
Labour. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: Non-regular payments are included. 
Sweden 
Definition: Gross annual earnings of full-year, full-time workers. 
Source: Household survey (Income Distribution Survey). 
Publication/data provider: Statistics Sweden. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: New basis, consistent with 1991 change in tax base and spliced onto old series 
prior to 1989. 
United Kingdom 
Definition: Gross weekly earnings of all full-time workers (i.e. on adult or junior rates of 
pay). 
Source: Enterprise survey (New Earnings Survey). 
Publication/data provider: (former) U.K. Department of Employment. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: The data refer to employees whose pay was not affected by absence and include 
overtime and other supplementary payments.   35
United States 
Definition: Gross usual weekly earnings of full-time workers aged 16 and over. 
Source: Household survey (Current Population Survey). 
Publication/data provider: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Workers not covered: No exclusions. 
Note: Earnings deciles are Secretariat interpolations of the unpublished BLS tabulations 
of the distribution of employees by earnings class. 
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